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ABSTRACT
The development of new antibiotics is dependent on their performance in economic models that favour
products with large markets, high levels of potential sales and low development risks. There is a trend
toward more severe and more widespread market restrictions for the use of antibiotics, ostensibly to
control resistance, though they may be enacted through the control of drug budgets. The restrictions
reduce the potential earnings of new antibiotics. In addition, more stringent regulatory procedures
increase development costs and risk. As a consequence, compared with drugs for other diseases,
particularly chronic diseases, antibiotics perform poorly in economic decision models and are therefore
less likely to be selected by pharmaceutical companies for continued development. Overall, this creates a
conﬂict between the twin objectives of controlling resistance through antibiotic restriction and
addressing resistance clinically through the introduction of new agents. Ultimately, this may lead to
the accelerated loss of efﬁcacy for currently available agents, as we become more dependent on them.
Moreover, the new agents that we need to maintain our current levels of health will be lacking in
pharmaceutical pipelines. Antibiotic resistance is inevitable; the development of new antibiotics is,
however, under threat. Unless the market conditions can be economically rebalanced to encourage
innovation and investment, or new models of pharmaceutical development can be applied to this area,
the number of companies with active antibiotic research programmes will continue to fall. Just as we
should not be complacent regarding the development of resistance, we should not be complacent in
assuming that the antibiotics of tomorrow will be there when we need them.
Keywords Antibiotic resistance, pharmaceutical development, pharmaceutical regulation, rational
antibiotic prescribing, review
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a general belief,
though it now seems naı¨ve, that we had won the
war against infectious diseases. Smallpox had
been eradicated, measles had been conquered (at
least in the developed world) and there was an
expectation that further vaccines would become
available that could manage other common infec-
tions. Antibiotics had reduced the complications
and mortality associated with infectious diseases
to levels that could not have been imagined even
a generation before.
This complacency was general, not restricted to
the pharmaceutical industry, and reﬂected in the
medical, political and social thinking of the time.
In 1967, the US Surgeon General William H.
Stewart stated that it was ‘time to close the book
on infectious diseases, declare the war against
pestilence won, and shift national resources to
such chronic problems as cancer and heart dis-
ease’. As a consequence of this type of thinking,
research and development (R&D) efforts were
shifted to chronic conditions, such as diabetes and
heart disease as well as cancer; this was not just a
proﬁt-motivated shift, but a medical and social
imperative at the time. In fact, it is realistic to
believe that some of the pharmaceutical advances
in these chronic conditions would not have been
achieved had resources not been diverted from
antibiotic research.
By 2005, the number of pharmaceutical com-
panies that maintained active, in-house R&D
capacity in antibiotics had decreased to about
eight. Partly this was through downsizing of
antibiotic R&D in the 1970s and 1980s, but
extensive merger and acquisition activity in the
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last decade has also reduced the number of single
companies involved. However, a number of
prominent companies actively decided to stop
investing in antibiotic R&D relatively recently. In
2001, Eli Lilly and Bristol-Myers Squibb stopped
work on developing new antimicrobial drugs.
Not only does this threaten the development of
new drugs against existing drug-resistant patho-
gens, it also undermines our capacity to respond
rapidly to the threat of emerging infectious
diseases.
There is no doubt that, in the past, many
pharmaceutical companies invested considerable
resources in antibiotic R&D with exceptional
results. By the early 1970s, 11 distinct antibiotic
classes and more than 270 antibiotics had been
brought into clinical use [1]. So what has
changed? In the face of ever increasing resistance,
and a growing need for novel agents, why has
R&D in this area faltered?
This article will examine some of the reasons
why antibiotic research has been cut back and
why it is becoming an increasingly philanthropic
area of investment for drug companies, as barriers
to developing, registering and marketing new
agents erode commercial interests. It will also
look at some of the measures that could be
introduced to stimulate renewed investment in
this area of therapy.
ECONOMICS OF DRUG
DEVELOPMENT
The costs of bringing a new pharmaceutical
product into clinical use are staggering. For
example, in 2001, the Tufts Center for the Study
of Drug Development estimated the average cost
to develop a new prescription drug as US $ 802
million, nearly 3.5 times the cost of developing a
new drug in 1987 [2]. The US Department of
Health and Human Services provided an even
higher estimate based on 2002 data: US $ 1.7
billion represented an increase of 55% over
5 years. Based on these numbers, even Eli Lilly’s
blockbuster product, Prozac, which earned
approximately $ 21 billion in total [3], would only
provide enough income to launch a maximum of
12 new products, not counting the costs of prod-
ucts that fail during development and general
overheads.
With more sophisticated whole cell screening
techniques and early assays for compounds that
not only have activity, but also drug-like proper-
ties, choosing those compounds that have the
greatest chance of clinical success is becoming
more reliable. Thus, there is the potential for a
more ‘front-loaded’ model of drug development.
It has been estimated that a 10% improvement in
predicting failures before clinical trials could save
$ 100 million in development costs per drug [4].
However, whether we will see a ‘biotechnology
payback’ of this sort is still unclear as the capital
investment in these more sophisticated tech-
niques is substantial [5]. Thus, although such
innovations may reduce some of the risk of late
failure, they may not impact on the overall cost of
bringing a new antibiotic to market. For the
foreseeable future, it is likely that costs will
continue to rise and greater efforts are needed to
seek out innovative approaches to antibiotic
development.
Economic considerations are now the most
common reason for terminating drug develop-
ment, ahead of efﬁcacy and safety [5]. This is
not just an issue for antibiotics. Although R&D
costs have been rising by about 8% per year
overall, the numbers of new drugs receiving
regulatory approval continues to fall. In 1995,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
received approximately 40 applications for new
molecular entities; by 2003 this had fallen to
approximately 25 and an even more dramatic
decline has been seen in applications for new
biologics [6]. In addition, the expiry of patents
on some of the most proﬁtable drugs ever
developed has affected most of the large phar-
maceutical companies over the last 10 years,
reducing certainty concerning future revenue
streams [7]. The potential for developing ‘block-
buster’ drugs in the future is also decreasing as
drug therapies become more diversiﬁed. As a
consequence, pharmaceutical development deci-
sions are likely to become more risk averse.
Net present value
Net present value (NPV) is a ﬁgure used for
evaluating an investment decision and is widely
used in the pharmaceutical industry to determine
the viability of speciﬁc products and to compare
investment strategies. Using this model, economic
costs and beneﬁts of a development programme
are estimated according to current values. In
short, it describes the relationship between the
26 Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 12 Supplement 5, August 2006
 2006 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 12 (Suppl. 5), 25–34
projected costs of the project and the potential
returns in terms of cash ﬂow.
An NPV >0 means that the project will be of
beneﬁt to the company; a sensitivity analysis can
be run to determine the range of NPVs for
different scenarios, such as ﬁrst to market vs.
second, and whether a speciﬁc indication is
achieved. Monte Carlo simulations are now gen-
erally used to create a picture of the combined
risks at different points in the development
process through several thousand scenarios [8].
Thus, an element of risk assessment is incorpor-
ated and, in the case of pharmaceuticals, this also
includes the likelihood of obtaining regulatory
approval. Fig. 1 shows the basic relationship
between NPV and the potential for marketing
approval.
Antibiotic restrictions impact NPV by reducing
the potential proﬁt. Increased regulatory hurdles
may also shift acceptable projects into more
marginal projects by increasing development
costs and by reducing the chances of a successful
registration in the indications needed to obtain a
satisfactory return on the investment (Fig. 1).
Resistance also has an impact on NPV. An
agent to which resistance will develop rapidly,
due to cross-resistance with existing antibiotic
classes, through inadequate dosing, a low genetic
barrier to resistance or overuse in ‘reservoir’
populations, such as children in day care and
nursing home residents, will have a shorter useful
clinical lifespan than an agent for which antimi-
crobial activity is preserved over a longer period
(Fig. 2). Thus, to maximise NPV, it is in the
interests of pharmaceutical companies to mini-
mise the emergence and spread of antimicrobial
resistance; this is counterintuitive to the popular
belief that pharmaceutical companies are focused
on selling as much product in as short a time as
possible.
Of course, the length of patent protection is also
an issue here. It may appear that there is little to
be gained commercially by preserving the useful
life of an antibiotic past the end of the patent-
protection period. However, for successful anti-
biotics, companies will often try to preserve their
franchise through life-cycle management options,
such as high-dose or extended-release formula-
tions. In some cases, if the antibiotics offer
substantial clinical beneﬁts, these life-cycle exten-
sions can be more proﬁtable than the original
formulations, although peak sales are likely to be
lower.
Importantly, it should be remembered that
NPV is used to compare projects, both within
the antibiotic pipeline and across the entire
portfolio. Not all leads can be progressed, and
there is considerable competition for resources
among projects. As mentioned previously, drug
development is an expensive business, and phar-
maceutical companies must necessarily pursue
Antibiotic restrictions reduce cash flow
Increased regulatory hurdles increase costs
NPV
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Fig. 1. The relationship between net present value (NPV)
and the potential for successful pharmaceutical registra-
tion, and the impact of antibiotic restrictions and increased
regulatory hurdles.
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those projects that have the greatest NPV and
lowest relative risk of failure. Unfortunately,
compared with drugs for chronic conditions,
antibiotics perform poorly with regard to NPV.
A typical NPV for an antibiotic would be 100, vs.
300 for an anticancer drug, 720 for a neurological
drug and 1150 for a muscular-skeletal drug [9].
Any drug with an NPV <100 is unlikely to be
progressed by a large pharmaceutical company,
so antibiotics really are on the borderline. Even if
an antibiotic makes it past the selection stage and
into development, it may well be scheduled as a
lower priority than other competing drugs in the
portfolio. In this way, a company seeks to
maximise NPV across the whole portfolio over a
given time.
Different companies also have different risk
tolerances and different objectives in terms of
diversiﬁcation across several disease areas vs.
specialisation in a few. The heritage of the
company is also a factor. A company that has
had substantial involvement in antibiotics in the
past is likely to be one of the last to leave this area,
possibly even after it has ceased to be a major part
of the business of that company.
IMPACT OF REGULATORY ISSUES
Regulatory guidance can have a pivotal effect on
the progress of R&D. Not only do regulatory
agencies set the criteria by which new drugs are
evaluated, they also determine the parameters
within which they can be marketed. A key
example of the impact of regulatory guidance on
antibiotic development in particular is illustrated
by the 2001 announcement by the FDA and the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA) regarding changes in the
requirements for clinical trials.
A new antibiotic is required to show noninfer-
iority to a currently registered agent in clinical
trials. The FDA and other agencies had previously
used a sliding-scale approach to determining
noninferiority, with the lower limit of the 95%
conﬁdence interval (CI) (or one-sided 97.5% CI)
for the experimental drug being less than 10–20%
lower than the reference drug, which was termed
the delta value. The delta value used depended
on the anticipated cure rates and number of
evaluable patients expected for that indication; for
antibiotics, it was typically 15%. However, the
FDA had two main concerns regarding this
approach. Firstly, the FDA believed that the
selection of successively less effective comparator
agents results, over time, in the presumed ‘equiv-
alence’ of statistically and clinically inequivalent
products (termed ‘bio-creep’) [10]. Secondly, the
recognised effectiveness of certain products chan-
ges with time, because of alterations in resistance
patterns and the development of new knowledge
[10]. As a consequence, the FDA and the EMEA
recommended a change in the delta value to 10%.
This may seem a small change, but it threatened
to severely curtail or even halt R&D in antibiotics.
The problem is that such a change more than
doubles the number of patients required for
clinical trials [11]. Already, increases in the costs
of running phase II and III clinical trials are
largely responsible for the huge increase in the
cost of bringing a drug to market seen over the
last 5–10 years [6]. The cost of running these
larger trials and the length of time that they
would require pushes the overall expense of
developing a new antibiotic to a level that cannot
be justiﬁed economically. For example, reducing a
delta value from 15% to 10% would result in an
NPV of 100 being reduced to approximately 35
[9]. Furthermore, this delays the availability of
new agents.
In addition, for indications that are relatively
uncommon, such as meningitis, recruiting the
necessary number of patients with a delta of 10%
would take many years and require the involve-
ment of many different centres across the globe.
The infrastructure for conducting such a trial
would have to be put in place, adding to costs and
delays. Moreover, the comparator at the start of
such a long trial may not be the ‘standard’
therapy at the end of the trial – making the
results less relevant.
These changes resulted in a number of anti-
biotic programmes being put on hold, and are
also credited with causing at least two pharma-
ceutical companies to withdraw from antibiotic
development entirely. In February 2002, the FDA
responded to these unwanted policy effects by
convening a meeting with the Pharmaceuticals
Research and Manufacturers of America and
the Infectious Diseases Society of America [12].
The outcome of this meeting was that an across
the board delta value of 10% was dropped in
favour of a more case-based approach, taking into
account the indication, projected efﬁcacy and
comparators, while maintaining safety and valid-
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ity [12]. In practice, the FDA has a great deal of
input into comparator regimens and thus is in an
ideal position to manage these issues. This meet-
ing averted a crisis and drug development
resumed in most cases, although there were some
enduring casualties, such as the antibiotic re-
search programmes of Eli Lilly and Bristol-Myers
Squibb, as well as delays in the development of
new products, such as tigecycline. In addition,
there remains a degree of uncertainty regarding
the requirements for clinical assessment, which
may tip the balance against investing in antibiotic
development.
IMPACT OF ANTIBIOTIC
RESTRICTIONS
Restrictions on antibiotic prescribing are becoming
more common at all levels of decision making
within healthcare structures (Fig. 3). For example,
in Belgium, a campaign to reduce antibiotic pre-
scribing included downward pressure through a
positionpaper in a professional journal, and a letter
to family practitioners and pharmacists. In addi-
tion, family practitioners received feedback on
their prescribing habits. Simultaneously, upward
pressure was generated through patient education
initiatives, such as booklets and leaﬂets, television
and radio advertising ⁄ features, a website and a
press conference [13].
Examples of the increasing stringency of antibi-
otic restrictions include the need for antibiograms
(which are not usually available in primary prac-
tice) before prescribing (Greece), local guidelines
leading to the omission of newer antibiotics from
hospital formularies (UK), and quotas for generic
substitutions and parallel imports (Germany).
Such measures of high-level control are a paternal-
istic response to the need to encourage appropriate
prescribing. Unfortunately, they completely cir-
cumvent the clinical interaction between the phy-
sician and patient, and make assumptions
regarding medical need on a population basis that
may not be justiﬁable at the level of the individual.
The consequences of these interventions on clinical
outcomes are scarcely investigated, although data
are generally collected on their impact on drug
budgets and antibiotic consumption.
There is therefore a direct conﬂict between the
two aims of antibiotic management: on the one
hand, to restrict the use of these agents to prevent
the spread of resistance; and on the other, a call for
the development of new agents to ﬁght resistant
strains. Market restriction stiﬂes innovation and
investment; fewer antibiotics are developed, leav-
ing usmore dependent on existing agents that may
no longer be maximally effective. An increased
dependency on a reduced number of antibiotics
may also accelerate the development and spread of
resistance to these agents. Overall, this creates a
vicious circle, potentially resulting in an increase in
the incidence of infectious complications and
mortality, with a limited pharmacological re-
sponse, and eventually leading us back to the
conditions of the preantibiotic age (Fig. 4).
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
ENCOURAGING ANTIBIOTIC R&D
Most articles on the need for new antibiotics
criticise the pharmaceutical industry for not
investing enough in the development of new
agents. However, we should also remember that
were it not for the investment of these companies
Reduced prescribing
Antibiotic restrictions:
•  Licensing
•  Reimbursement authorities
•  National review bodies/guidelines/formularies
•  Regional targets/guidelines
•  Local formulary committees
•  Physician
•  Practice budgets
   (impacted by incentives/penalties set nationally)
•  Patient
   (through antibiotic consumption/patient education campaigns)
Fig. 3. Antibiotic restrictions are being placed at many
levels throughout the healthcare management structure.
Increased resistance
Decreased incentive for R&D
Greater reliance on
existing agents
Increased antibiotic
restriction
Fig. 4. Antibiotic restrictions lead to decreased innovation
and investment in antibiotic research and development
(R&D).
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in the past, we would be in a much worse position
than we are today. In fact, between 1999 and 30
June 2005, there have been 11 new antibiotics
approved by the FDA, i.e., new chemical entities,
not reformulations or new indications (Table 1)
[14]. In comparison, there have been 22 neurolog-
ical products (including those for depression,
psychiatric disorders, Alzheimer’s, multiple scler-
osis, Parkinsonism, pain and migraine), 22 oncol-
ogy products (including anti-emetics), 16
cardiology products (including cholesterol man-
agement drugs), nine drugs for use in diabetes,
seven antiretrovirals, four products for respirat-
ory indications and four nonhuman immunode-
ﬁciency virus (HIV) antivirals approved during
this period. In addition, the majority of the new
antibiotics registered were new classes, or new
subclasses of an agent, and the remainder had
signiﬁcant advantages over earlier representatives
of their class in terms of their antibacterial
spectrum. In particular, the spread of methicil-
lin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in hospitals and
now into the community has initiated a wave of
new antibiotics with activity against this patho-
gen. Overall, the pharmaceutical industry has
responded to medical need, despite the regula-
tory and market barriers. However, it is clear that
antibiotic drug development is at the fringe of
economic viability and this commitment is un-
likely to persist as these barriers are progressively
increased.
It is worth stating that no government has
successfully discovered and developed an antibi-
otic, and it is unlikely that any public body would
have the resources or technical ability to do this.
Thus, we are essentially dependent on the phar-
maceutical industry to provide us with new anti-
microbial agents and there needs to be a dialogue
between stakeholders on how this can best be
achieved. Encouragingly, the pharmaceutical com-
panies that have maintained antibiotic R&D,
despite mounting disincentives, have done so
partially because of a strong heritage in the area
and a depth of expertise. A new impetus is needed
to kick-start antibiotic R&D again and shift the
perception of this therapy area frombeing a ‘nice to
keep’ component to a ‘must have’ for these com-
panies.
The options outlined below provide some
examples of how antibiotic R&D could be encour-
aged and sustained. If we are serious about the
need to preserve public health in the face of
antibiotic resistance, the responsibility for the
development of new agents needs to be assumed
not just by pharmaceutical companies, but by
other stakeholders, including governments, regu-
lators and public health systems.
Balancing incentives
Balancing incentives are measures that compen-
sate for the reduction in NPV caused by antibiotic
restrictions and the increased risk due to regula-
tory requirements.
Allowing higher prices for new antibiotics is an
obvious incentive that raises NPV. Based on the
speciﬁc restriction policies and their perceived
impact on sales (market penetration), a compen-
satory price could be agreed. A drawback of this
approach is that prices are only currently dis-
cussed after regulatory approval has been gran-
ted; thus it would still represent an unknown risk.
It may also be too inﬂexible should the environ-
ment change and it becomes necessary to use the
new agents more widely.
Related to pricing is the possibility for guaran-
teed orders or national formulary inclusion for an
antibiotic that has proved to meet a certain
medical need. This would be particularly beneﬁ-
cial for serious, but uncommon, infections, allow-
ing pharmaceutical companies to reduce
projected future costs, thus boosting NPV, and
anticipate future sales more accurately. However,
these arrangements would have to be nonexclu-
sive or have a time limit in order to avoid
suppressing the development of suitable follow-
on antibiotics to keep ahead of resistance devel-
opment.
Direct economic incentives have been applied
to other areas of pharmaceutical development,
most recently to stimulate the development of
agents active against anthrax. These include tax
incentives, one-off investments for capital expen-
diture and ﬁnancial ‘rewards’ or ‘prizes’ for
successful innovations. Tax credits on R&D
investment may tip the balance in favour of
retaining otherwise economically marginal re-
search projects. Tax credits on sales spread the
funding burden over the entire tax base, which is
potentially more attractive to legislators [1].
Extending the period of patent protectionwould
not only increase the NPV, but would also act as a
further incentive for pharmaceutical companies to
take a more long-term view in order to preserve
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antimicrobial efﬁcacy in the face of resistance.
Such changes would require new legislation, and
may be opposed by generic manufacturers. How-
ever, generic manufacturers do not bear the risks
of drug development. Also, patent extensions
could be granted for speciﬁc indications or for
additional indications that are investigated after
the initial approval has been granted.
A variation on this idea is the ‘wild-card’ patent
extension. In this model, a pharmaceutical com-
pany that brings a new and medically useful
antibiotic to market could be granted the option of
patent extension on any other approved product
in their portfolio. This could mean a substantial
additional income for a successful and established
product. A drawback of extended patent protec-
tion is that the burden of funding is placed on
patients and payers, rather than spread through-
out society. As healthcare systems are under
increasing ﬁnancial pressure, this may be a
politically and socially unattractive option [1].
Regulatory reform that would shorten the time
to market would also act as an incentive. Even
reducing the regulatory process by as little as
1 year would have a signiﬁcant impact on the
attractiveness of a drug development project. As
the trend has been toward more stringent regu-
latory assessments and increased delays, this
would require a considerable modiﬁcation of
outlook on the part of the regulatory bodies.
However, the FDA has started to address this by
introducing priority review, which reduces the
time from 10 months to 6 months, for antibiotics
that meet certain criteria for medical need based
mainly on high prevalence, the seriousness of the
infection and limited treatment options, among
other things. Although this is a step in the right
direction, it is more reactive to the current levels
of resistance than proactive regarding future
needs. The FDA has also been considering devel-
oping a new ‘critical path’ model to streamline
drug development [6]. However, any improve-
ments in this process are likely to be applied
across the board to all therapy areas and would
not realign the discrepancy between the NPV for
antibiotics and those for drugs to treat other
conditions.
New models of antibiotic R&D
The traditional model of a large R&D effort
sustained by the proﬁts of highly commercially
successful compounds is no longer working for
antibiotic drug development. On the one hand, as
the only viable source of new antibiotics, phar-
maceutical companies have an ethical responsi-
bility to continue R&D in this area. On the other
hand, companies must continue to be proﬁtable to
remain in business and have a responsibility to
their shareholders to provide risk: return ratios on
their investment comparable to other companies,
both in the same sector and elsewhere. It is
difﬁcult to resolve these issues in an environment
where higher risks and lower returns make
antibiotic drug development an unattractive area
for even the most committed of companies.
Although the notion that prioritising sharehol-
der value over developing new antibiotics may
seem economically hard-headed, it should be
remembered that shareholders are bearing the
risk of developing new pharmaceuticals and, if
they are uncomfortable with that level of risk,
they are perfectly free to invest in another
pharmaceutical company or invest out of the
sector altogether.
The problems that we now see in antibiotic
development are not new to the pharmaceutical
industry. The same issues of economic viability
have held back R&D for rare diseases and for
diseases associated mainly with the developing
world. As a response to this, new models of
pharmaceutical development have emerged that
may provide a useful guide to future sustainable
models of antibiotic development.
Orphan drug status is a strategy that has been
applied to ﬁnd and develop drug therapies for
rare diseases. Although deﬁnitions of a ‘rare
disease’ vary, the World Health Organization
estimates that between 5000 and 8000 conditions
qualify as a rare disease [15]. More than half of
these are genetically related and would require
intensive (and costly) efforts to identify and
develop therapies. The Orphan Drug Act was
introduced in the USA in 1983. The provisions of
the Act require that the disease be present in
< 200 000 patients, and that the costs of R&D
cannot be recovered within 7 years. Incentives for
orphan drug development include 7 years of
market exclusivity, regulatory fee waivers, 50%
tax credit on clinical research, grants for clinical
research, protocol assistance, priority regulatory
review, and research grants for medical devices
and medical food [15]. In 2000, similar orphan
drug incentives were introduced in Europe [15].
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Although market exclusivity may not be appro-
priate in the case of antibiotics, because of the
need for follow-on agents as resistance develops,
certainly a package of incentives to encourage
R&D based on ‘public health’ needs would be a
useful boost to antibiotic drug development.
Partnering agreements between smaller discov-
ery companies, often in the biotechnology sector,
and large pharmaceutical companies is another
option. As more risk-averse large pharmaceutical
companies withdraw from the antibiotic market,
and as medical need evolves as a result of the
development of antibiotic resistance, niches for
smaller, more economically ﬂexible companies
are emerging. Small biotechnology companies are
more tolerant of higher risk projects, but need
further resources and expertise to develop prod-
ucts through clinical trials and into the market-
place. Once a project has reached ‘proof of
concept’ stage, investment on the part of larger
pharmaceutical companies is more forthcoming,
as the risks of failure can be more accurately
predicted. In-licensing of products in this way
is likely to become more common. However,
biotechnology companies still have to satisfy
investors that antibiotics represent good long-
term investment potential.
Public–private partnerships are a new model of
pharmaceutical discovery and development that
has been applied with encouraging results for
diseases of the developing world. Organisations
such as the Medicines for Malaria Venture and TB
Alliance have radically improved the outlook for
the development of new drugs to ﬁght these
diseases. The model roughly follows the normal
pharmaceutical development plan with a ‘mini-
portfolio’ of different leads being managed
according to the relative risk:beneﬁt ratio, but
where the element of proﬁt has been reduced or
removed, although the cost of goods is an import-
ant consideration when trying to minimise prices.
The public organisations often bear much of the
cost of R&D, with the pharmaceutical partners
providing facilities, infrastructure, and scientiﬁc,
regulatory and manufacturing expertise, as well
as covering overhead costs.
These partnerships often also include academic
organisations involved in more basic research on
disease processes. In fact, one of the major issues
in drug development in recent years has been the
widening gap between the fast pace of basic
scientiﬁc research, particularly genomics, and the
more sedate pace of drug development [6]. The
linking process between these two aspects is often
referred to as ‘translational research’. This des-
cribes research that tries to convert the advances
in our understanding of genetic and biochemical
processes, which may represent valid pharma-
ceutical targets, into screening assays against
which large compound libraries can be rapidly
tested for activity with the aim of identifying
candidate drugs. These compound libraries and
the large-scale ultra-high-throughput screening
facilities are generally sited within large R&D
pharmaceutical companies. Thus, public–private
partnerships act as a catalyst to bring together
drug targets and the means by which to identify
possible candidate therapies, without requiring
vast new capital expenditure and without expos-
ing the pharmaceutical companies to a level of
risk that cannot be economically justiﬁed. If we
are truly in a crisis of antibiotic development, then
this model is a proven strategy for encouraging
innovation within a framework that allows new
discoveries to be exploited pharmacologically
with a risk proﬁle that is acceptable to commercial
pharmaceutical companies.
A recent model of pharmaceutical development
challenges the necessity for commercial success in
pharmaceutical development. The Institute for
OneWorld Health was set up as the world’s ﬁrst
not-for-proﬁt pharmaceutical company to investi-
gate new therapies for neglected diseases preval-
ent in the developing world. Funding for this
enterprise comes from a range of philanthropic
sources. However, it must be remembered that
funding bodies, just like shareholders, will be
cautious of high-risk projects unless the need is
acute and alternative approaches are lacking.
Furthermore, the capital outlay required for anti-
biotic research is likely to be beyond even the
most generous donations, and access to the R&D
capabilities of pharmaceutical companies, parti-
cularly in the discovery phase, would still be
required.
CONCLUSIONS
Resistance is inevitable if we use antibiotics at all.
We must use antibiotics, but we must use them
wisely. Policies that aim to manage resistance
development and spread are being set every day.
However, the consequences of these policies on
resistance [16], as well as on clinical outcomes,
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remain essentially unknown (see Price, this sup-
plement, page 3).
Many pharmaceutical companies pulled out of
antibiotics in the early 1980s, because of a lack of
medical need. Today, as a result of increased
market and regulatory barriers, the remaining
companies working in this area are ﬁnding it
increasingly difﬁcult to justify continued research
aimed toward antibiotic drug development. As it
takes 8–12 years to bring a new pharmaceutical
agent to market [17], we cannot afford to wait
until we are in crisis. We understand so little
about the dynamics of antibiotic resistance devel-
opment in the community that predicting the next
crisis is a hit and miss affair, and we need to
spread our efforts for drug development across a
range of potentially dangerous public health
outcomes. Innovation and investment in antibi-
otic development has to be proactively encour-
aged to ensure that the next generation of
antibiotics is not too little too late.
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